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Abstract
We consider the general problem of a set of agents trading a portfolio of assets in the
presence of transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs and we study,
with analytical and numerical methods, the resulting Nash equilibria. Extending signifi-
cantly the framework of Schied and Zhang (2018), who considered two agents and one asset,
we focus our attention on the conditions on the value of transaction cost making the trading
profile of the agents, and as a consequence the price trajectory, wildly oscillating and the
market unstable. We find that the presence of more assets, the heterogeneity of trading skills
(e.g. speed or cost), and a large number of agents make the market more prone to large
oscillations and instability. When the number of assets is fixed, a more complex structure of
the cross-impact matrix, i.e. the existence of multiple factors for liquidity, makes the market
less stable compared to the case when a single liquidity factor exists.
Keywords: Market impact; Game theory and Nash equilibria; Transaction costs; Market
microstructure; High Frequency Trading.
1. Introduction
Instabilities in financial markets have always attracted the attention of researchers, policy mak-
ers and practitioners in the financial industry because of the role that financial crises have on
the real economy. Despite this, a clear understanding of the sources of financial instabilities
is still missing, in part probably because several origins exist and they are different at dif-
ferent time scales. The recent automation of the trading activity has raised many concerns
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about market instabilities occurring at short time scales (e.g. intraday), in part because of
the attention triggered by the Flash Crash of May 6th, 2010 (Kirilenko et al. (2017)) and the
numerous other similar intraday instabilities observed in more recent years (Brogaard et al.
(2018), Calcagnile et al. (2018), Golub et al. (2012), Johnson et al. (2013)), such as the Trea-
sury bond flash crash of October 15th, 2014. The role of High Frequency Traders (HFTs), Algo
Trading, and market fragmentation in causing these events has been vigorously debated, both
theoretically and empirically (Brogaard et al. (2018), Golub et al. (2012)).
One of the puzzling characteristics of market instabilities is that a large fraction of them
appear to be endogenously generated, i.e. it is very difficult to find an exogenous event (e.g. a
news) which can be considered at the origin of the instability (Cutler et al. (1989), Fair (2002),
Joulin et al. (2008)). Liquidity plays a crucial role in explaining these events. Markets are, in
fact, far from being perfectly elastic and any order or trade causes prices to move, which in
turn leads to a cost (termed slippage) for the investor. The relation between orders and price is
called market impact. In order to minimize market impact cost, when executing a large volume
it is optimal for the investor to split the order in smaller parts which are executed incrementally
over the day or even across multiple days. The origin of the market impact cost is predatory
trading (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), Carlin et al. (2007)): the knowledge that a trader
is purchasing progressively a certain amount of assets can be used to make profit by buying at
the beginning and selling at the end of the trader’s execution. Part of the core strategy of HFTs
is exactly predatory trading. Now, the combined effect on price of the trading of the predator
and of the prey can lead to large price oscillations and market instabilities. In any case, it is
clear that the price dynamics is the result of the (dynamical) equilibrium between the activity
of two or more agents simultaneously trading.
This equilibrium can be studied by modeling the above setting as a market impact game
(Carlin et al. (2007), Lachapelle et al. (2016), Moallemi et al. (2012), Schied and Zhang (2018),
Scho¨neborn (2008), Strehle (2017a,b)). In a nutshell, in a market impact game, two traders
want to trade the same asset in the same time interval. While trading, each agent modifies the
price because of market impact, thus when two (or more) traders are simultaneously present,
the optimal execution schedule of a trader should take into account the simultaneous presence
of the other trader(s). As customary in these situations, the approach is to find the Nash
equilibrium, which in general depends on the market impact model.
Market impact games are a perfect modeling setting to study endogenously generated market
instabilities. A major step in this direction has been recently made by Schied and Zhang (2018).
By using the transient impact model of Bouchaud et al. (2009, 2004) plus a quadratic temporary
impact cost (which can alternatively be interpreted as a quadratic transaction cost, see below),
they have recently considered a simple setting with two identical agents liquidating a single asset
and derived the Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, they also derived analytically the conditions on
the parameters of the impact model under which the Nash equilibrium displays huge oscillations
of the trading volume and, as a consequence, of the price, thus leading to market instabilities1.
Specifically, they proved the existence of a sharp transition between stable and unstable markets
1In their paper, Schied and Zhang interpret the large alternations of buying and selling activity observed at
instability as the ”hot potato game” among HFTs empirically observed during the Flash Crash (CFTC-SEC
(2010), Kirilenko et al. (2017)).
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at specific values of the market impact parameters.
Although the paper of Schied and Zhang highlights an key mechanism leading to market
instability, several important aspects are left unanswered. First, market instabilities rarely
involve only one asset and, as observed for example during the Flash Crash, a cascade of
instabilities affects very rapidly a large set of assets or the entire market (CFTC-SEC (2010)).
This is due to the fact that optimal execution strategies often involve a portfolio of assets rather
than a single one (see, e.g. Tsoukalas et al. (2019)). Moreover, commonality of liquidity across
assets (Chordia et al. (2000) and cross-impact effects (Schneider and Lillo (2019)) make the
trading on one asset trigger price changes on other assets. Thus, it is natural to ask: is a large
market more or less prone to market instabilities? How does the structure of cross-impact and
therefore of liquidity commonality affect the market stability? A second class of open questions
regards instead the market participants. Do the presence of more agents simultaneously trading
one asset tends to stabilize the market? While the solution of Schied and Zhang considers only
two traders, it is important to know whether having more agents is beneficial or detrimental
to market stability. For example, regulators and exchanges could implement mechanisms to
favor or disincentive participation during turbulent periods. Answering this question requires
solving the impact game with a generic number of agents. Moreover, while in Schied and
Zhang the two investors are identical, real markets are characterized by huge heterogeneity in
trading skills. For example, some agents (e.g. HFTs) are much faster than others, some agents
use more sophisticated trading strategies and have smaller trading costs, etc. Is this traders’
heterogeneity beneficial to market stability? Do HFTs destabilize markets?
In this paper we extend considerably the setting of Schied and Zhang by answering the above
research questions. Specifically, we consider (i) the case when the two agents trade multiple
assets simultaneously and cross market impact is present; (ii) the case when J > 2 agents
simultaneously trade one asset; (iii) the case when agents have different trading skills, either
because the temporary or permanent impact paid by one agent is smaller than the one paid
by the other or because one of the two agents (an HFT) is faster than the other in submitting
orders. In each of these cases we derive the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding impact game.
Then we derive, either analytically or numerically, the conditions under which the market does
display huge oscillations and is therefore unstable. The different ’paths’ leading to market
instability are therefore highlighted, finding, surprisingly, that larger, more competitive, and
more heterogeneous markets are more prone to market instability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some notation of the market
impact games framework and we introduce definitions of market stability. We extend the basic
model of Schied and Zhang (2018) to the multi-asset case in Section 3, where we find the Nash
equilibrium and we analyse numerically the cross-impact effect. In Section 4 we study how the
cross-impact matrix affects the market stability and we prove, under certain general structure
of the cross-impact matrix, that market is asymptotically unstable. In Section 5 we extend
the framework to the multi-agent case and finally in Section 6 we explore how the presence
of heterogeneous agents, either in terms of cost or in terms of speed, may affect the market
stability and the equilibrium.
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2. Market Impact Games
Consider two traders who want to trade simultaneously a certain number of shares, minimizing
the trading cost. Since the trading of one agent affects the price, the other agent must take into
account the presence of the former in optimizing her execution. This problem is termed mar-
ket impact game and has received considerable attention in recent years (Carlin et al. (2007),
Lachapelle et al. (2016), Moallemi et al. (2012), Schied and Zhang (2018), Scho¨neborn (2008),
Strehle (2017a,b)). The seminal paper by Schied and Zhang, (Schied and Zhang (2018)), con-
siders a market impact game between two identical agents trading the same asset in a given
time period.
When none of the two agents trade, the price dynamics is described by the so called unaf-
fected price process S0t which is a right-continuous martingale defined on a given probability
space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0,F ,P). A trader wants to unwind a given initial position with inventory Z0,
where a positive (negative) inventory means a short (long) position, during a given trading
time grid T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, where 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T and following an admissible
strategy, which is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Admissible Strategy). Given T and Z0, an admissible trading strategy for T
and Z0 ∈ R is a vector ζ = (ζ0, ζ1, . . . , ζN ) of random variables such that:
• ζi ∈ Fti and bounded, ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , N.
• ζ0 + ζ1 + · · ·+ ζN = Z0.
The random variable ζk represents the order flow at trading time tk where positive (negative)
flow corresponds to a sell (buy) trade of volume |ζk|. We denote with X0 and Y0 the initial
inventories of the two considered agents playing the game and with ξ = {ξk}k∈T and η = {ηk}k∈T
their respective strategies.
Traders are subject to fees and transaction costs and their objective is to minimize them
by optimizing the execution. As customary in the literature, the costs are modeled by two
components. The first one is a temporary impact component modeled by a quadratic term θξ2k
which does not affect the price dynamics. This is sometimes called slippage and depends on the
immediate liquidity present in the order book. Notice that, as discussed in Schied and Zhang
(2018), this term can also be interpreted as a quadratic transaction fee. Here we do not specify
exactly what this term represents, sticking to the mathematical modeling approach of Schied
and Zhang.
The second component is related to permanent impact and affects future price dynam-
ics. Following Schied and Zhang (2018), we consider the celebrated transient impact model of
Bouchaud et al. (2009, 2004), which describes the price process Sξ,ηt affected by the strategies
ξ,η of the two traders, i.e.,
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t −
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk)(ξk + ηk), ∀ t ∈ T,
where G : R+ → R is the so called decay kernel, which describes the lagged price impact of
a unit buy or sell order over time. Usual assumptions on G are satisfied, i.e., it is convex,
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nonincreasing, nonconstant, and t 7→ G(|t|) is strictly positive definite in the sense of Bochner.
Notice that by choosing a constant kernel G, one recovers the celebrated Almgren-Chriss model
(Almgren and Chriss (2001)).
The cost faced by each agent is the sum of the two components above. Specifically, let us
denote with X (X0,T) the set of admissible strategies for the initial inventory X0 on a specified
time grid T, the cost functions are defined as:
Definition 2.2 (Schied and Zhang (2018)). Given T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, X0 and Y0. Let (εi)i=0,1,...N
be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli
(
1
2
)
-distributed random variables that are independent of
σ(
⋃
t≥0 Ft). Then the cost of ξ ∈ X (X0,T) given η ∈ X (Y0,T) is defined as
CT(ξ|η) =
N∑
k=0
(
G(0)
2
ξ2k − S
ξ,η
tk
ξk + εkG(0)ξkηk + θξ
2
k
)
+X0S
0
0
and the costs of η given ξ are
CT(η|ξ) =
N∑
k=0
(
G(0)
2
η2k − S
ξ,η
tk
ηk + (1− εk)G(0)ξkηk + θη
2
k
)
+ Y0S
0
0 .
Thus the execution priority at time tk is given to the agent who wins an independent coin
toss game, represented by a Bernoulli variable εk, which is a fair game in the framework of
Schied and Zhang (2018). In this setting, the two agents are equally likely to arrive first in
each interval. In Section 6 we study how the Nash equilibrium changes when this hypothesis is
relaxed, i.e. one agent is ”faster” than the other one, possibly because she is a HFT.
Given the time grid T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN} and the initial values X0, Y0 ∈ R, we define the
Nash Equilibrium as a pair (ξ∗,η∗) of strategies in X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) such that
E[CT(ξ
∗|η∗)] = min
ξ∈X (X0,T)
E[CT(ξ|η
∗)] and
E[CT(η
∗|ξ∗)] = min
η∈X (Y0,T)
E[CT(η|ξ
∗)].
One of main results of Schied and Zhang (2018) is the proof, under general assumptions,
of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, they showed that this
equilibrium is deterministically given by a linear combination of two constant vectors, namely
ξ∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)v +
1
2
(X0 − Y0)w (1)
η∗ =
1
2
(X0 + Y0)v −
1
2
(X0 − Y0)w, (2)
where the fundamental solutions v and w are defined as
v =
1
eT (Γθ + Γ˜)−1e
(Γθ + Γ˜)
−1e
w =
1
eT (Γθ − Γ˜)−1e
(Γθ − Γ˜)
−1e.
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and e = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ RN+1. The kernel matrix Γ ∈ R(N+1)×(N+1) is given by
Γij = G(|ti−1 − tj−1|), i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1,
and for θ ≥ 0 it is Γθ := Γ + 2θI, and the matrix Γ˜ is given by
Γ˜ij =

Γij if i > j
1
2G(0) if i = j,
0 otherwise.
As showed by Schied and Zhang (2018) all these matrices are definite positive.
An interesting result of Schied and Zhang (2018) concerns the stability of the Nash equilib-
rium related to the transaction costs parameter θ and the decay kernel G. Generically, following
Schied and Zhang (2018), we say that a market is unstable if the trading strategies at the Nash
equilibrium exhibit spurious oscillations, i.e., if there exists a sequence of trading times such
that the orders are consecutively composed by buy and sell trades. In the optimal execution
literature such behavior is termed transaction triggered price manipulation, see Alfonsi et al.
(2012). Figure 1 shows the simulation of the price process under the Schied and Zhang model
when both investors have an inventory equal to 1 for two values of θ. The unaffected price
process is a simple random walk with zero drift and constant volatility and the trading of the
two agents, according to the Nash equilibrium, modifies the price path. For small θ (top panel)
the affected price process exhibits wild oscillations, while when θ is large (bottom panel) the
irregular behavior disappears2.
To clarify better our results, we introduce two definitions of market stability:
Definition 2.3 (Strong Stability). The market is strongly (uniformly) stable if ∀ θ the Nash
Equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈ X (X0,T)×X (Y0,T) does not exhibit spurious oscillations ∀X0, Y0 ∈ R.
Definition 2.4 (Weak Stability). The market is weakly stable if there exists an interval I ⊆ R
such that ∀ θ ∈ I the Nash Equilibrium (ξ∗,η∗) ∈ X (X0,T) × X (Y0,T) does not exhibit
spurious oscillations ∀X0, Y0 ∈ R.
Schied and Zhang (2018) showed that when the trading time grid is equispaced, TN , and
under general assumptions on G, the market is not strongly but only weakly stable where I,
the stability region, is equal to [θ∗,+∞) where θ∗ = G(0)/4. Thus, they showed the existence
of a critical value of θ such that for smaller values of this threshold the equilibrium strategies
exhibit oscillations of buy and sell orders for both traders. Hence, the behavior at zero of the
kernel function plays a relevant role for the equilibrium stability.
As mentioned in the introduction, this result has been proved for a market with only M = 1
asset, two homogeneous traders (same θ and same trading speed), and J = 2 agents. In this
work we extend this stability result by first extending the framework of Schied and Zhang (2018)
2Moreover, we observe that the presence of spurious oscillations in the price dynamics may affect the consis-
tency of the spot volatility estimation. Indeed, these oscillations act as a market microstructure noise, even if
this noise is caused by the oscillations of a deterministic trend, while usually it is characterized by some additive
noise term. In particular, we find that when θ is close to zero the noise is amplified by spurious oscillations, while
for sufficiently large θ these oscillations do not compromise the consistency of the spot volatility.
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Figure 1: Blue lines exhibit the price process when both agents have inventory equals to 1. The
top (bottom) panel shows the dynamics when θ = 0.01 (θ = 1.5). The trading time grid has
N + 1 = 51 points, G(t) = exp(−t), the volatility of the unaffected price process is fixed to 1
and S0 = 100. The vertical grey dotted lines delineates the trading session. The yellow lines
shows the drift dynamics due to trading.
in the multi-asset (M > 1) case and solving the related Nash equilibrium. We then present an
extension of the framework in a multi-agent market (J > 2), where we analyse numerically the
Nash equilibrium and the market stability. Finally, we study the Nash equilibrium also when
the two players are heterogeneous with different transaction costs and trading velocity.
3. Multi-asset market impact games
As a first extension of the basic setting, we consider the case of two agents trading a portfolio
of M > 1 assets. Indeed, agents often liquidate portfolio positions, which accounts in trading
simultaneously many assets. In general, the optimal execution of a portfolio is different from
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many individual asset optimal executions, because of (i) correlation in asset prices, (ii) com-
monality in liquidity across assets (Chordia et al. (2000)), and (iii) cross-impact effects. In the
following we will focus mainly on the third effect, even if disentangling them is a challenging
statistical problem.
To proceed, we first extend the notion of admissible strategy to the multi-asset case. Straight-
forwardly, given a fixed time grid T and inventory Z0 ∈ R
M , the matrix Ξ =
(
ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξN
)
∈
R
M×(N+1) of random variables is an admissible strategy if (i) ξk ∈ R
M is Ftk -measurable and
bounded ∀ k and (ii) Z0 =
∑N
k=0 ξk. Consistently with the previous notation, for each trading
time ξk and ηk are M -vectors containing the order flows for the M -assets of the two agents
X and Y , i.e. ηk,i is the order flow of the first agent when trading asset i ar time tk. Finally,
X0,Y0 ∈ R
M are the initial inventories of the two agents.
The second important point is that the trading of one asset modifies also the price of the
other asset(s). This effect is termed cross-impact. While self-impact may be attributed to a
mechanical and induced consequence of the order book, the cross-impact may be understood as
an effect related to mispricing in correlated assets which are exploited by arbitrageurs betting
on a reversion to normality, see Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Schneider and Lillo (2019) for
further details. Cross-impact has been empirically studied recently, see e.g. Mastromatteo et al.
(2017), Schneider and Lillo (2019) and its role in optimal execution has been highlighted in
Tsoukalas et al. (2019).
Mathematically cross-impact is modeled by introducing a function Q˜ : RM ×R+ → RM de-
scribing how the trading of theM assets affect their prices at a certain future time. Schneider and Lillo
(2019) have discussed necessary conditions for the absence of price manipulation for multi-asset
transient impact models. They have shown that the cross-impact function need to be symmetric
and linear in order to avoid arbitrage and manipulations. Moreover, as empirically observed by
Mastromatteo et al. (2017), we assume the same temporal dependence of G among the assets.
Then, we assume that Q˜ = Q · G(t) where Q is linear and symmetric, i.e., Q ∈ RM×M and
Q = QT and G : R+ → R. Also, we assume that Q is a nonsingular matrix. Therefore, the
price process during order execution is defined as
S
Ξ,H
t = S
0
t −
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk) ·Q · (ξk + ηk)
where we refer to Q ∈ RM×M as the cross-impact matrix, S0t ∈ R
M is the unaffected price
process which is right-continuous martingale defined on a suitable probability space.
Finally, we opportunely generalize the notion of expected costs of a strategy and we extend
the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.1 (Expected Costs). Let (εk ∈ R
M )k=0,1,...,N be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli
(1/2) rvs which are independent of σ(∪tFt) and mutually independent. The cost of Ξ given H
is defined as
CT(Ξ|H) = 〈X0,S
0
0〉+
N∑
k=0
(
G(0)
2
〈Qξk, ξk〉 − 〈S
Ξ,H
tk
, ξk〉+G(0)〈Q(εk ⊗ ξk),ηk〉+ θ〈ξk, ξk〉
)
,
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where εk ⊗ ξk :=
(
εk,1 · ξk,1, · · · , εk,M · ξk,M
)T
is the Hadamard product, which means for
each trading time k and each asset i the time priority is decided by a Bernoulli game. The cost
of H given Ξ is defined as
CT(H|Ξ) = 〈Y0,S
0
0〉+
N∑
k=0
(
G(0)
2
〈Qηk,ηk〉 − 〈S
Ξ,H
tk
,ηk〉+G(0)〈Q(εk ⊗ ξk),ηk〉+ θ〈ηk,ηk〉
)
,
where εk := (1− εk).
The previous definition is motivated by the following argument. When only X trades, the
prices are moved from SΞ,Htk to S
Ξ,H
tk+
= SΞ,Htk −G(0)Qξk . However, the order is executed at the
average price and the player incurs in the expenses
−
1
2
〈(SΞ,Htk + S
Ξ,H
tk+
), ξk〉 =
G(0)
2
〈Qξk, ξk〉 − 〈S
Ξ,H
tk
, ξk〉.
Then, Y trades immediately after X and the prices are moved linearly from SΞ,Htk+ to S
Ξ,H
tk+
−
G(0)Qηk, so the cost for Y is given by:
−
1
2
〈(SΞ,Htk+ + S
Ξ,H
tk+
)−G(0)Qηk,ηk〉 =
G(0)
2
〈Qηk,ηk〉 − 〈S
Ξ,H
tk
,ηk〉+G(0)〈Qξk ,ηk〉.
We derive a compact formula for the expected costs which will be used for deriving the
equation determining the Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2.
E[CT(Ξ|H)] = E[tr(Ξ Γ˜(QΞ)
T ) + tr(Ξ Γ˜(QH)T ) + θtr(ΞT Ξ)]
All the proofs are given in Appendix A.
3.1. Nash equilibrium for the linear cross impact model
We now prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in this multi-asset setting.
This is easily achieved by using the spectral decomposition of Q to orthogonalize the assets,
which we call “virtual” assets, so that the impact of the orthogonalized strategies on the virtual
assets is fully characterized by the self-impact, i.e., the transformed cross impact matrix is
diagonal. Thus, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium derives immediately by
following the same argument as in Schied and Zhang (2018).
The notion of Nash equilibrium is generalized as follows.
Definition 3.3 (Nash Equilibrium). Given the time grid T and initial values X0,Y0 ∈ R
M ,
a Nash Equilibrium is a pair of matrices (Ξ∗,H∗) of strategies in X (X0,T) × X (Y0,T) such
that:
E[CT(Ξ
∗|H∗)] = min
Ξ∈X (X0,T)
E[CT(Ξ|H
∗)] and
E[CT(H
∗|Ξ∗)] = min
H∈X (Y0,T)
E[CT(H|Ξ
∗)].
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Remark 3.4. If we suppose that Q is the identity matrix, then the multi-asset market impact
game is a straightforward generalization of the Schied and Zhang (2018) model. Indeed, each
order of the two players for the i-th stock does not affect any other asset. So, the Nash-
equilibrium can be easily found by solving M Schied and Zhang (2018) models.
Let us consider the spectral decomposition of Q, i.e., QV = V D, where V is the eigenvectors
matrix and D the diagonal matrix which contains the respective eigenvalues. Since we assume
that Q is a non singular symmetric matrix, then D is diagonal with all elements different from
zero. We define the prices of the virtual assets as Pt := V
TS
Ξ,H
t and we observe that
Pt = P
0
t −
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk) ·D · V
T (ξk + ηk)
= P 0t −
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk) ·D · (ξ
P
k + η
P
k ),
where P 0t := V
TS0t , ξ
P
k := V
T ξk and η
P
k := V
Tηk. These last two quantities are the strategies
of the two traders in the virtual assets. Also the inventory of the agents is transformed by V T .
Since the virtual assets are mutually orthogonal by construction, the decay kernel is multiplied
by the eigenvalues of the cross impact matrix, i.e., for each trading time tk,
G(t− tk) ·D =

G(t− tk)λ1
G(t− tk)λ2
. . .
G(t− tk)λM
 .
Then, we can find for each virtual asset the Nash equilibrium using the Schied and Zhang (2018)
results. Finally, given the optimal strategies Ξ∗,P and H∗,P for the virtual assets we can recover
the Nash equilibria for SΞ,Ht using the inverse transformation, ξ
∗
k = V ξ
∗,P
k and η
∗
k = V η
∗,P
k .
3.2. Types of agents
To understand the rich phenomenology that can be observed in a multi-asset market impact
game, we introduce three types of traders:
• the Fundamentalist wants to trade one or more assets in the same direction (buy or sell).
Notice that a Fundamentalist can have zero initial inventory for some assets;
• the Arbitrageur has a zero inventory to trade in each asset and tries to profit from the
market impact payed by the the other agents;
• the Market Neutral has a non zero volume to trade in each asset, but in order to avoid
to be exposed to market index fluctuations, the sum of the volume traded in all assets is
zero3.
3Real Market Neutral agents follow signals which are orthogonal to the market factor, thus they typically are
short on approximately half of the assets and long on the other half. The sum of trading volume is not exactly
equal to zero but each trading volume depends on the β of the considered asset with respect to the market factor.
In our stylized market setting, we assume that all assets are equivalent with respect to the market factor.
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We remark that an Arbitrageur is a particular case of a Market Neutral agent in the limit case
when the volume to trade in each asset is zero. Clearly in a single-asset market we have only
two types of the previous agents, since a Market Neutral strategy requires at least two assets.
3.3. Cross Impact Effect and Liquidity Strategies
The presence of multiple assets and of cross impact can affect the trading strategy of an agent
interested in liquidating only one asset. In particular, as we show below, it might be convenient
for such an agent to trade (with zero inventory) the other asset(s) in order to reduce transaction
costs.
To prove this we focus on the two-asset case, M = 2, and we analyse the Nash equilibrium
when the kernel function has an exponential decay4, G(t) = e−t. The first trader is a Funda-
mentalist who has to liquidate the position in the first asset, i.e., X10 = 1, while the second
agent is an Arbitrageur, i.e., Y 10 = 0. We set an equidistant trading time grid with 26 points
and θ = 1.5. The second asset is available for trading, but let us consider as a benchmark case
when both agents trade only the first asset. This is a Schied and Zhang (2018) game. Figure 2
exhibits the Nash Equilibrium for the two players. We observe that the optimal solution for the
Fundamentalist is very close to the classical U-shape derived under the Transient Impact Model
(TIM)5, i.e. our model when only one agent is present. However, the solution is asymmetric
and it is more convenient for the Fundamentalist to trade more in the last period of trading.
This can be motivated by observing that at equilibrium the Arbitrageur places buy order at the
end of the trading day, and thus she pushes up the price. Then, the Fundamentalist exploits
this impact to liquidate more orders at the end of the trading session. We remark that the
Arbitrageur earns at equilibrium, since her expected cost is negative (see the caption).
Now we examine the previous situation when the two traders solve the optimal execution
problem taking into account the possibility of trading the other asset. We define the cross im-
pact matrix Q =
[
1 q
q 1
]
, where q = 0.6. In Figure 3 we report the optimal solution where the
inventory of the agents are set to be X0 =
(
1 0
)T
and Y0 =
(
0 0
)T
. The Fundamentalist
wants to liquidate only one asset, but, as clear from the Nash equilibrium, the cross-impact
influences the optimal strategies in such a way that it is optimal for him/her to trade also the
other asset. In terms of cost, for the Fundamentalist trading the two assets is worse off than in
the benchmark case (see the values of E[CT(Ξ
∗|H∗)] in captions). However, if the Fundamen-
talist trades only asset 1 and Arbitrageur trades both assets, the former has a cost of 0.4935
which is greater than the expected costs associated with Figure 3. Thus, the Fundamentalist
must trade the second asset if the Arbitrageur does.
For completeness we compare the expected costs when the two agents may decide to trade
i) both assets, i.e., they consider market impact game and cross-impact effect, or ii) one asset,
i.e., they only consider the market impact game. Table 1 exhibits the expected costs of both
4All our numerical experiments are performed with exponential kernel as in (Obizhaeva and Wang (2013)).
Schied and Zhang shows that the form of the kernel does not play a key role for stability, given that the conditions
given above are satisfied.
5Given the initial inventory X0, the optimal strategy in the standard TIM is ξ =
X0
e
TΓ−1
θ
e
Γ−1
θ
e, see for further
details Schied and Zhang (2018).
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Figure 2: Nash equilibrium Ξ∗ of the Fundamentalist and H∗ of the Arbitrageur trading only
one asset. The trading time grid is equidistant with 26 points and θ = 1.5. The expected costs
are equal to E[CT(Ξ
∗|H∗)] = 0.4882, E[CT(H
∗|Ξ∗)] = −0.0370.
Arbitrageur
1 Asset 2 Asset
F
u
n
d
am
en
ta
li
st
1 Asset (0.4882,−0.0370) (0.4935,−0.0412)
2 Asset (0.4836,−0.0334) (0.4885,−0.0377)
Table 1: Payoff matrix of expected costs when the Fundamentalist and Arbitrageur inventories
are equal to (1 0)T and (0 0)T , respectively. We have highlighted in red the Nash Equilibrium
associated with this payoff matrix
.
Fundamentalist and Arbitrageur and it is clear that both agents prefer to trade both assets.
Actually, the state where both agents trade two assets is the Nash equilibrium of the game
where each agent can choose how many assets to trade.
The solution presented above is generic, but an important role is played by the transaction
cost modeled by the temporary impact. When the temporary impact parameter θ increases,
the benefit of the cross-impact vanishes, and the optimal strategy of the Fundamentalist tends
to the solution provided by the simple TIM with one asset and no other agent. We find that
the difference between these expected costs is negative, i.e. it is always optimal to trade also
the second asset, but converges to zero for large θ.
4. Market instability and cross impact structure
In this Section we study whether the increase of the number of assets and the structure of cross
impact matrix help avoiding oscillations and market instability at equilibrium according to the
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Figure 3: Optimal strategies for a Fundamentalist (Ξ∗) and an Arbitrageur (H∗), where their
inventories are equal to (1 0)T and (0 0)T , respectively. Q =
[
1 0.6
0.6 1
]
, and the trading time
grid is an equidistant time grid with 26 points. The expected costs are equal E[CT(Ξ
∗|H∗)] =
0.4885, E[CT(H
∗|Ξ∗)] = −0.0377 when θ = 1.5.
definitions of Section 2. To this end we consider different structures of the cross-impact matrix
Q describing the complexity of the market for what concerns commonality in liquidity.
We first show that instabilities are generically observed also in the multi-asset case and that
actually more assets make the market less stable. For simplicity let us consider M = 2 assets
and a game between a Fundamentalist and an Arbitrageur (similar results hold for different
combinations of agents). We choose G(t) = e−t, the cross impact equal to Q =
[
1 0.9
0.9 1
]
, and
we consider θ = 0.25; remember that for the one asset case the market is stable for this value of
θ. Figure 4 shows that for this value of θ the strategies are oscillating and therefore the market
is not strongly stable. More surprisingly, the fact that oscillations are observed for θ = 0.25
indicates that the transition between the two stability regimes depends on also on the number
of assets and that more assets require larger values of θ to ensure stability. In the following we
prove that this is the case and we determine the threshold value.
Figure 4 shows also the case θ = 0. Notably, in this case the oscillations in the second
asset disappear. This is due to the fact that, since Γ10, (Γ
2
0), the Γ matrix associated with the
first (second) virtual asset is equal to (1 + q)Γ, ((1 − q)Γ), the combination of “fundamental”
solutions v and w are the same for the two virtual assets. Thus, at the equilibrium the two
solutions for the second asset are exactly zero.
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Figure 4: Nash Equilibrium for a Fundamentalist and an Arbitrageur, where their inventories
are equal to (1 0)T and (0 0)T respectively. The blue lines are the optimal solution when θ = 0
and the red lines when θ = 0.25. The trading time has 51 points and Q =
[
1 0.9
0.9 1
]
.
Finally, it is worth noting that, if S =
∑
k |ξk,2| denotes the total absolute volume traded
by the Fundamentalist on the second asset, then limθ→0 S = 0 and limθ→∞ S = 0 as exhibited
from Figure 5. This means, that when the cost of trades increases it is not anymore convenient
for both traders to try to exploit the cross impact effect as observed in Section 3.
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Figure 5: Cumulative traded volume of the second asset by the Fundamentalist when playing
against an Arbitrageur as a function of θ. The inset shows the same curve in semi-log scale.
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We have shown in a simple setting that having more than one available asset does not help
improving the strong stability of the market and increases the threshold value between stable
and unstable markets. We show that when the number of assets tends to infinity the market
does not satisfy the weak stability condition.
In the one asset setting, if we choose a sufficiently large θ the instability vanishes. Therefore,
this raises the question whether the equilibrium instability is still present when the number of
assets increases. To this end we introduce the definition of asymptotic stability.
Definition 4.1 (Asymptotically weakly stable). The market is asymptotically weakly stable if
it is weakly stable when M →∞.
Given this definition, we prove the following:
Theorem 4.2 (Asymptotic Instability). Suppose that G is a continuous, positive definite,
strictly positive, log-convex decay kernel and that the time grid is equidistant. Let (λi)i=1,..,M be
the spectrum of the cross-impact matrix Q. The market is unstable if θ < θ∗ where
θ∗ = max
i=1,2,...,M
G(0) · λi
4
. (3)
Moreover, if the largest eigenvalue of the cross-impact matrix diverges for M →∞, i.e.
limM→+∞ λmax = +∞, then the market is not asymptotically weakly stable.
The theorem tells that the instability of the market is related to the spectral decomposition
of the cross-impact matrix, i.e. to the liquidity factors. We analyze some realistic cross-impact
matrices and their implications for the stability of the Nash equilibrium. Schneider and Lillo
(2019) have derived constraints on the structure of the cross-impact for the absence of dynamic
arbitrage. They showed that the symmetry of the cross-impact matrix is one of these conditions.
Mastromatteo et al. (2017) estimated the cross-impact matrix on 150 US stocks showing that it
is roughly symmetric and has a block structure with blocks related to economic sectors. There-
fore, we focus on symmetric positive definite cross-impact matrix. The positive definiteness is
required in order to have a positive kernel on the virtual assets, recall Subsection 3.1 where it
is shown that for each virtual assets i the decay kernel is given by G(t− tk) · λi, for all trading
times tk, where λi is the i-th eigenvalue of Q. We consider the following cases:
• One Factor Matrix. We say that Q is a one factor matrix if Q = (1− q)I + q · eeT , where
e = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ RM and q ∈ (0, 1). The bounds on q guarantee the positive definiteness
of the cross-impact matrix. Then it holds:
Corollary 4.3. If the cross-impact matrix is a one factor matrix, then the market is not
asymptotically weakly stable.
This implies that when M increases the transactions cost θ must raise in order to prevent
market instability, since θ∗ = G(0)λmax/4 ∼ G(0)qM/4, because λmax = 1 + q(M − 1).
Figure 6 exhibits the equilibrium for a Fundamentalist and an Arbitrageur, when θ = 1.5,
q = 0.2 and M = 2000. The inventory of the Fundamentalist is 1 for the first 1000 assets
and zero for the others. The solutions clearly show spurious oscillations of buy and sell
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Figure 6: Nash equilibrium when θ = 1.5 with inventories X0 = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0)
T ∈ RM and
Y0 = (0, . . . , 0)
T ∈ RM , whereM = 2, 000. The cross impact matrix is a one factor matrix. The
blue lines exhibits the volume traded for any of the first 1, 000 assets, while the green ones are
those for any of the last 1, 000 assets.
orders. Notice that in the one asset case this value of θ gives a stable market. We observe
that the eigenvector corresponding to λmax is given by e, which represents an equally
weighted portfolio. As a consequence, if we consider a Market Neutral agent against an
Arbitrageur the solution becomes stable ∀ θ > (1 − q)/4, since both traders have zero
inventory on the first virtual asset. Thus, oscillations might disappear when the inventory
of the agents in the first virtual asset is zero.
A generalization of the above model considers Q as a rank-one modification matrix, i.e.
Q = D+ββT , where D = diag(1− β21 , . . . , 1− β
2
M ) and β ∈ R
M is a fixed vector. In this
way the cross impact is not the same across all pairs of stocks. We find again that the
market is not asymptotically stable because the threshold increases with M . Differently
from the previous case this is observed also in the case of a Market Neutral against an
Arbitrageur.
• Block Matrix. We now assume that the cross impact matrix has a block structure in such
a way that cross impact between two stocks in the same block i is qi, while when the two
stocks are in different blocks the cross impact is q. As mentioned above, this is consistent
with the empirical evidence in Mastromatteo et al. (2017).
Let us denote with Mi the number of stocks in block i, (i = 1, . . . K), and let Qi =
(1− qi)I + qi · eie
T
i ∈ R
Mi × RMi with qi ∈ (0, 1) and ei = (1, . . . , 1)
T ∈ RMi , where K is
16
the number of blocks. We define the cross impact matrix as:
Q :=

Q1 qe1e
T
2 · · · qe1e
T
K
qe2e
T
1 Q2 · · · qe2e
T
K
...
. . .
...
qeKe
T
1 · · · qeKe
T
K−1 QK
 ,
If the average number of stocks of a cluster tends to infinity when M goes to infinity, we
prove an analogue result as for the one factor matrix case:
Corollary 4.4. If Q is a block matrix, where each block is a one factor matrix, if
limM→+∞
M
K
→ +∞, then the market is not asymptotically weakly stable.
0 5 10 15 20 25
k
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Vo
lu
m
e 
tra
de
d
Market Neutral
0 5 10 15 20 25
k
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Vo
lu
m
e 
tra
de
d
Arbitrageur
Figure 7: Nash equilibrium when θ = 1.5 with inventories for the Market Neutral X0 =
(1, . . . , 1,−1, . . . ,−1)T ∈ RM and for the Arbitrageur Y0 = (0, . . . , 0)
T ∈ RM , whereM = 2000.
The cross impact matrix is a block matrix with K = 10. The figure exhibits the equilibria
related to one (the first) asset for each block. The trading time grid is an equidistant time grid
with 26 points. Each block has a cross-impact qi equal to 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 for i = 1, 2, . . . , 9 and
0.95 for the last one.
As an example, we consider K = 10 equally sized blocks from an universeM = 2, 000 assets
and set q = 0.1. With this kind of cross impact matrix, we have K large eigenvalues whose
eigenvectors correspond to virtual assets displaying oscillations. The optimal trading strategies
for stocks belonging to the same block are the same. Thus in Figure 7 we show the Nash
equilibrium for the first asset in each of the 10 blocks when the two agents are a Market Neutral
and an Arbitrageur. The oscillations are evident, as expected, in all traded assets.
We now study how the critical value θ∗ varies when the number of assets increases for
different structures of the cross impact matrix and therefore of the liquidity factors. Comparing
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different matrix structures is not straightforward since the critical value depends on the values
of the matrix elements. To this end we consider the set of symmetric cross impact matrices of
M assets having one on the diagonal and fixed sum of the off diagonal elements. More precisely
let h ∈ R, then we introduce for each M the set
AMh := {A ∈ R
M×M |AT = A,
∑
i>j
aij = h, aii = 1},
One important element of this set is the cross impact matrix Q1fac ∈ R
M×M of a one factor
model (see above) with off-diagonal elements equal to 2h/M(M − 1). In Appendix A we prove
the following:
Theorem 4.5. For a fixed h ∈ R, let us consider the related one-factor matrix Q1fac ∈ A
M
h ,
then
λ1(Q) ≥ λ1(Q1fac), ∀Q ∈ A
M
h ,
i.e. among all the matrices with one in the diagonal and constant sum of the off-diagonal terms,
the one-factor matrix (i.e. where all the off-diagonal elements are equal) is one with the smallest
largest eigenvalue.
Moreover, we prove in the last part of Appendix A that the previous is not a strict inequality,
by showing that both a diagonal block matrix, with identical blocks, and the one-factor matrix
have the same maximum eigenvalue.
This theorem implies that among all the cross impact matrices belonging to AMh , the one
factor case is among the most stable cross-impact matrices. For example, it is direct to construct
an example of a block diagonal cross impact matrix with non-zero off block elements (i.e. similar
to what observed empirically) and to prove that its critical θ∗ is larger than the critical value
for the one factor matrix having the same value h of total cross-impact.
5. Instability in market impact games with many agents
We now consider J > 2 agents trading the same asset (i.e. M = 1) in order to study how
the stability of the market is influenced by an increasing competition. This model represents
another important generalization of Schied and Zhang (2018) which considered only the case
J = 2.
The unaffected price process S0t is always assumed to be a right continuous martingale in a
suitable probability space. We denote with ξjk the order flow of agent j at time tk, so that the
affected price process is defined as
Sξt := S
0
t −
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk) ·
J∑
j=1
ξjk.
and we define ξj := (ξj0, ..., ξ
j
N )
T . In order to derive the equation for the expected costs of each
agent, we need to consider all the possible time priorities among the J traders at each time
step. To this end we assume that for each trading time tk there is a random permutation which
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determines the time priority, i.e., ∀k σk : {1, 2, . . . , J} → {1, 2, . . . , J}, where σk(j) denotes
the position of the j-th agent at time tk. Then, let
ξ−j := (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξj−1, ξj+1, . . . , ξJ ),
so if we consider all the possible time priorities among the J agents, we obtain for the expected
costs,
CT(ξ
j |ξ−j) =
N∑
k=0
G(0)
2
(ξjk)
2 +G(0)
J∑
i=2
1{σk(j)=i}
J∑
l=1,l 6=j
1{σk(l)<i,σk(j)=i}ξ
l
kξ
j
k − S
ξ
tk
ξjk + θ(ξ
j
k)
2
+Xj0S00 ,
where
∑N
k=0 ξ
j
k = X
j
0 denotes the inventory of the j-th agent. We observe that the trader j
pays the cost only of the other agents trading before her. Thus at time tk, this cost is given by
G(0)
J∑
i=2
1{σk(j)=i}
J∑
l=1,l 6=j
1{σk(l)<i, σk(j)=i}ξ
l
kξ
j
k,
where the indicator function in the first sum selects when the trader j is in position i in the
arrival queue and the second sum gives the cost of agents trading before the j-th trader. Also,
since 1{σk(j)=i} · 1{σk(l)<i, σk(j)=i} = 1{σk(l)<i, σk(j)=i}, the cost to the order ξ
j
k is given by
G(0)
J∑
i=2
J∑
l=1,l 6=j
1{σk(l)<i, σk(j)=i}ξ
l
kξ
j
k.
In order to compute the expected cost, we need to average over all the permutations of
traders’ arrival at each time. We prove the following important Lemma useful for the numerical
study of equilibrium.
Lemma 5.1.
E[CT(ξ
j |ξ−j)] = E[
1
2
(ξj)TΓθξ
j] +
N∑
k=0
ξjk
 J∑
i=2
∑
l 6=j
(i− 1)
J · (J − 1)
ξlk +
k−1∑
m=0
G(tm − tk)
∑
l 6=j
ξlm
 .
We now analyse numerically the Nash equilibrium emerging from the interaction of different
types of agent. Unless otherwise specified, we fix θ = 10 and N = 15. Moreover we introduce
a scaling parameter β ≥ 0 for the kernel function when J increases, i.e., G(t) = J−βe−t. The
case when β = 0 corresponds to the additive case, while for β = 1 the total instantaneous
impact does not depend on the number of agents. Hence, when β = 1 the aggregate impact of
all the agents is independent from J and we want to test whether the trading patterns are also
independent from it. Recent empirical evidences (Bucci et al. (2020)) show that market impact
depends on the aggregate net order flow of the optimal executions simultaneously present,
without individually distinguishing them.
To this end, we first study an homogeneous market with J identical Fundamentalist sellers
with the same initial inventory. In Figure 8 we report the Nash equilibria for the agents when
β = 0, 1/2, 1 and for different values of J . We remark that for each β the initial inventory Xj0 ,
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Figure 8: Optimal solution of a fundamental seller for different number J of agents and when the scaling parameter β is set to 0, 1/2, 1. The time
grid contains 16 points.
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Figure 9: Numerical estimates of the critical value of θ as a function of the number of agents
when the time grid is fixed with 7 points for some scaling parameters. All agents are identical
Fundamentalist sellers.
for all agent j, is rescaled by J−β, and then, for improve readability, the displayed solutions are
normalized such that the sum of orders is equal to 1.
When the competition in the market increases, regardless of β, the optimal solution tends
to place more orders at the beginning of the trading sessions, instead of waiting the last trading
time. This synchronized trading of all the agents at the beginning of the trading period, as
resulting from the Nash equilibrium, could be at the origin of the market instability. On the
other hand, when β increases the equilibrium seems to be approximated by a flat straight line
with a constant trading volume over time. In any case, it is important to notice that when β = 1
the Nash equilibrium is not independent from the number of agents J . Thus, for example, the
equilibrium of J = 2 agents is not the same as the equilibrium of J = 4 agents with half the
impact and half the initial inventory6.
We now consider, in the same setting as above, how the stability of the market depends on
the number of agents and on the scaling parameter β. Specifically, we compute numerically the
critical value of θ after which the market is not stable. We choose a time grid equal to N = 6
and we study the three cases when β = 0, 1/2, 1 by increasing the number of agents. We find
that the increase of competition of the market, i.e. a larger number of agents competing for the
same objective, deteriorates its stability increasing θ∗ (see Figure 9). For β = 0 the points lie
approximately on a line and the addition of an agent increases θ∗ by approximately 0.4. On the
other hand, the instability seems to be relaxed when the scaling parameter increases, where the
relation with J becomes flatter. Notice however that when β = 1, i.e. the total impact of agents
6This analysis assumes that the initial inventory is the same for the agents. In Appendix B we explore the
case when this assumption is relaxed.
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Figure 10: Blue and red lines are the Nash equilibrium for the Fundamentalist traders. The
yellow line refers to the equilibrium of the Arbitrageur. The scaling parameter β is set to 0.
becomes approximately independent from J , θ∗ → 0.4 when J increases, and this asymptotic
value is larger than the one for two agents which is θ∗ = 0.25/2. We conclude that the increase
of the competition in a market may deteriorates its stability and, less surprisingly, it increases
the expected costs of a strategy.
Now we consider the cases when the agent are of different types. In particular, we focus on
the role of an Arbitrageur when two other agents are either identical or of opposite type.
First, we consider the case of two identical Fundamentalist sellers and one Arbitrageur
(J = 3) and we fix θ = 1.5. Figure 10 (left) displays the equilibrium solution for β = 0, to be
compared with the two agent case of Fig. 2. While the trading pattern of the Arbitrageur is
qualitatively similar to the one of the two agent case, the Fundamentalists trade significantly less
toward the end of the day. This is likely due to the fact that it might be costly to trade for one
Fundamentalist given the presence of the other. The expected costs for the two Fundamentalists
is equal to 0.9125 and −0.0885 for the Arbitrageur.
We then consider the case of a Fundamentalist buyer, a Fundamentalist seller and an Ar-
bitrageur in order to see whether this last agent is able to exploit, as a sort of market maker,
his/her position. Figure 10 (right) shows the Nash equilibrium for this case. It is clear that
the Arbitrageur barely trades and the expected costs are 0.13 and −3.98 · 10−07 for the two
Fundamentalists and the Arbitrageur, respectively. This indicates that the two Fundamentalists
are able to reduce significantly their costs with respect to the previous case, increasing their
protection against predatory trading strategies and that the Arbitrageur is not able to act as a
market maker. On the other hand, we observe (see the inset of Fig. 10) that the solution for
the Arbitrageur starts to exhibit some oscillations of purchase and sale, although his/her orders
remains of negligible size with respect to that of Fundamentalists.
6. Instability and heterogeneity of agents’ trading skills
Here we study the case of two agents trading one asset, but, differently from Schied and Zhang
(2018), we assume that the two agents are different in their trading skills. We consider separately
three sources of heterogeneity: different permanent impact, different temporary impact (or
trading fees), and different trading speed.
In the first setting, we study the case when the two agents affect with a different impact
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the price process. This might correspond to more sophisticated traders who are able to trade
more efficiently, for example using better algorithms for posting orders in the market. There is
an alternative interpretation, more in line with traditional market microstructure. Permanent
impact is considered a measure of the informativeness of trades, thus an agent with a very small
permanent impact might be interpreted as a noise trader. In our model the two interpretations
are indistinguishable. For analytical convenience, we assume the kernel G(t) is the same for the
two agents and we introduce two scaling parameters βi (i = 1, 2) such that the price process
dynamic affected by trading becomes7
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t −
N∑
k=0
G(t− tk)(J
−β1ξk + J
−β2ηk), (4)
where J = 2. We observe that when two agents have different β’s this does not compromise the
market stability. Indeed, the previous equation can be rewritten as
Sξ,ηt = S
0
t −
N∑
k=0
G(t− tk)(ξ˜k + η˜k), (5)
where ξ˜k, η˜k are the strategies associated with the transformed inventories X˜0 = J
−β1X0,
Y˜0 = J
−β2Y0. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of equation 4 is related to the equilibrium of
equation 5, i.e., the are equal up to constants, and in particular the stability is not compromised.
We just mention that if, for instance, β1 = 0 and β2 = 1, i.e. the impact of the second agent
is half the one of the first agent, and both agents are Fundamentalist sellers, the sophisticated
(or uninformed) agent Y has the advantage as if he/she should trade half of his volume. Figure
11 exhibits the Nash equilibrium for both traders. As expected, the optimal trading pattern
is different for the two traders. More interestingly, the trading profile of the agent with small
impact resembles the one of an Arbitrageur (see for comparison Fig. 2). Thus, from the point
of view of the trading profile, an Arbitrageur with zero inventory or a Fundamental trader with
small impact behaves in a similar way at equilibrium. Remember that the latter can be seen
either as a skilled trader or as a noise trader. Moreover, the expected cost for the β = 0 and
β = 1 sellers are equal to 0.6521 and 0.2582, respectively. When both agents have β = 0, the
costs are equal to 0.7975, thus the reduction of impact of one agent is indeed beneficial to both
traders.
In the second setting, we consider two agents with different temporary impact parameter
θ. This might correspond to the again to the case where one of the two agents has more
sophisticated trading strategy or to a market where different class of traders are allowed to pay
different fees. This is indeed quite standard for example in ATS where liquidity providers have
lower fees than liquidity takers. In particular, we want to test whether only one agent with
θ below threshold is sufficient to destabilize the market or if both agents must have θ < θ∗.
We denote with θX and θY the temporary impact parameter for the two agents. We study
the Nash equilibrium by solving numerically the Schied and Zhang (2018) game in the setting
7Note that this is equivalent to saying that the G(t) of the two agents are proportional one to each other, i.e.
the two agents differ in the value of G(0).
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Figure 11: Nash equilibrium for two Fundamentalist sellers when θ = 1.5. The left (right) figure
is referred to the agent with β1 = 0 (β2 = 1). The trading time grid is an equidistant grid with
26 points and the decay kernel is G(t) = exp(−t).
where both agents are Fundamentalist seller with X0 = Y0 = 1. When both agents are above
threshold (θ∗ < θY < θX = 2θY , see Figure 12), we observe that the more significant difference
between the two solutions is in the trading schedule of low θ agent, who trades more at the
beginning of the trading session. It is interesting to consider the changes in cost. When θ = 1 for
both agents, the individual cost is 0.7970. Suppose now that θY is reduced to 0.5 (for example
because a new type of agent enters the market or because the fee schedule changes for some
class of traders). As expected, the expected cost of agent Y is reduced (0.7317), but there is a
negative effect on the other agent X who sees her cost soar to 0.8286. Thus, the decrease of θ
for a class of agents impacts negatively the other market participants.
When we examine the case when one of the agents has a θY smaller than the critical value
θ∗ = 0.25, we find numerical evidences that the equilibrium becomes unstable also for the Fun-
damentalist agent X for which θX > θ
∗. This suggests that in a market with few sophisticated
traders with small temporary impact (HFTs) or agents allowed to pay lower fees, the instability
comes up for all the agents in the market, regardless for their own θs. In other words, market
instability is driven by the agent with the smallest θ and having even few sophisticated traders
(in terms of costs or fees) destabilizes the market.
The third and last setting assumes that the two traders are different because one of the two
is faster than the other. A fast trader could represent, for example, an HFT. In market impact
games one has to decides who arrives first in the market at each time step, because the laggard
is going to pay the impact of the trade of the leader. In the standard setting, this is decided by
a fair Bernoulli trial, which means that on average each trader is the leader half of the times.
We modify this and for each trading time tk the Bernoulli game εk deciding the trading priority,
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Figure 12: Red lines are the Nash equilibrium when both traders have θ = 1. Blue lines are
the solution when X has θ = 1 and Y has θ = 0.5. The trading time grid is an equidistant grid
with 16 points and the decay kernel is G(t) = exp(−t).
is no longer fair, i.e.,
εk =
1, with probability p0, with probability 1− p p ∈ [0, 1]
where εk = 1 means that Y places the k-th order before X, so that X has to take into account
the impact of Y in her cost. Let us denote with ξ (η) the Nash equilibrium for X (Y ), then we
observe that E[CT (ξ|η)] = E[
1
2ξ
TΓθξ + ξ
TΓpη] and E[CT (η|ξ)] = E[
1
2η
TΓθη + η
TΓ1−pξ], since
N∑
k=0
ξk
(
pηk +
k−1∑
m=0
ηmG(tk − tm)
)
= ξTΓpη where (Γp)ij =
Γ˜ij, i 6= jp ·G(0), i = j .
E[CT (ξ|η)] E[CT (η|ξ)] p
0.7970 0.7970 1/2
0.8173 0.7765 2/3
0.8274 0.7662 3/4
0.8333 0.7601 4/5
0.8568 0.7360 1
Table 2: Expected costs of the two agents X and Y as a function of the trading speed p
(probability of arriving first on the market) of Y . When p = 1 the agent Y places orders always
before of X.
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Figure 13: Nash equilibrium in function of the trading speed p (probability of arriving first on
the market) of Y . The red dotted lines are the Nash equilibrium when both traders have the
same trading speed, i.e., p = 0.5. The time grid has 16 points, θ = 1 and G(t) = exp(−t).
Figure 13 exhibits the Nash equilibrium of the two traders for several values of p and Table
2 reports the corresponding expected costs. We observe that when p increases, the optimal
solution for the HFT Y is to liquidate slightly faster in the first period and then sell the
remaining part of the inventory with a lower intensity, with respect to the solution with p = 0.5,
at the end of the trading session. For the slow trader X the behavior is exactly opposite to the
one of the fast trader. However the differences between Nash equilibria for different p are quite
small, while the greatest benefit for the HFT is the smaller trading costs (see Table 2).
Finally, we ask whether the presence of a fast trader modifies the critical value of θ when
the instability starts. Figure 14 shows how θ∗ varies as a function of the trading speed p for
a games between two Fundamentalist sellers8. Since we compute the critical value using a
numerical method there are some small oscillations. We observe a small but significant trend
of θ∗ as a function of p. This result indicates that the presence of an HFT makes the market
more prone to oscillations and instabilities. However the effect is relatively small compared to
the other possible sources of instabilities studied in the previous sections.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we used market impact games to investigate several potential determinants of
market instabilities driven by finite liquidity and simultaneous trade execution of more agents.
Specifically, we extended the results of Schied and Zhang (2018) in several directions. We first
considered a multi-asset market where we introduced the cross-impact effect among assets.
We solve the Nash equilibrium, we analysed the optimal solution provided by the equilibrium,
and we studied the impact of transaction costs on liquidation strategies. Secondly, we studied
8We also repeat the same experiment in the presence of an Arbitrageur against a Fundamentalist and we find
analogous results.
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Figure 14: Numerical estimates of the critical value θ∗ as a function of the trading speed p
(probability of arriving first on the market) of the HFT. We set N = 6 for the time grid and
G(t) = exp(−t). Both agents are Fundamentalist sellers.
the stability of the market when the number of assets increases and we found that for most
realistic cross-impact structures the market is intrinsically unstable. Even if asymptotically the
instability arises in all cases, we found that when the structure of the cross-impact matrix is
complex, for example it has a block or multi-factor structure, the instability transition occurs
for higher values of the impact parameter. Thus, all else being equal, the temporary impact (or
the transaction fees) must be larger in order to observe stability. We also generalize the market
impact game of Schied and Zhang (2018) to a multi-agent setting and we found clear evidence
that more competition in the market compromises its stability. Finally, we consider how the
impact of heterogeneous agents affects the stability of the market, considering both different
impact or transaction costs and different access speed to the markets among the traders. While
the presence of a single agent with low transaction cost is sufficient to undermine stability, we
found that differential speed (e.g. a HFT) modifies only slightly the transition between the
stable and unstable phase of the market.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the results
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We observe that E[εk ⊗ ξk] =
1
2 · E[ξk], since εk ∈ R
M is a vector of
independent Bernoulli’s random variable. WLOG G(0) = 1.
E[CT(Ξ|H)]− 〈X0,S
0
0〉 =
= E
[ N∑
k=0
(
1
2
〈Qξk, ξk〉 − 〈S
Ξ,H
tk
, ξk〉+ 〈Q(εk ⊗ ξk),ηk〉+ θ〈ξk, ξk〉
)]
= E
[ N∑
k=0
(
1
2
〈Qξk, ξk〉+
1
2
〈Qξk,ηk〉+
− 〈S0tk −
k−1∑
m=0
G(tk − tm)Q(ξm + ηm), ξk〉+ θ〈ξk, ξk〉
)]
= E
[
−
N∑
k=0
〈ξk,S
0
tk
〉+ 1/2
N∑
k=0
〈Qξk, ξk〉+
N∑
k=0
〈
k−1∑
m=0
G(tk − tm)Qξm, ξk〉+
+
N∑
k=0
〈1/2 ·Qηk +
k−1∑
m=0
G(tk − tm)Qηm, ξk〉+
N∑
k=0
θ〈ξk, ξk〉
]
,
but
E
[ N∑
k=0
〈ξk,S
0
tk
〉
]
= E
[
〈
N∑
k=0
ξk,S
0
T 〉
]
= 〈X0,S
0
0〉,
N∑
k=0
θ〈ξk, ξk〉 = θtr(Ξ
T Ξ),
1/2
N∑
k=0
〈Qξk, ξk〉+
N∑
k=0
〈
k−1∑
m=0
G(tk − tm)Qξm, ξk〉 = tr(Ξ Γ˜(QΞ)
T ),
N∑
k=0
〈1/2 ·Qηk +
k−1∑
m=0
G(tk − tm)Qηm, ξk〉 = tr(Ξ Γ˜(QH)
T ),
and we conclude that E[CT(Ξ|H)] = E[tr(Ξ Γ˜(QΞ)
T ) + tr(Ξ Γ˜(QH)T ) + θtr(ΞT Ξ)].
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We first observe that when we transform the real assets to the virtual
ones also the inventories of the traders are transformed. Indeed, if Pt denotes the virtual assets,
Pt = P
0
t −
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk)DV
T (ξk + ηk) = P
0
t −
∑
tk<t
G(t− tk)D(ξ
P
k + η
P
k ),
where V is the matrix where the columns are the eigenvectors of Q, D is the diagonal matrix
which contains the associated eigenvalues, and ξPk and η
P
k are the orders of the two traders
related to the virtual assets. In particular if X0 is the inventory of X, by definition
∑N
k=0 ξk =
X0, so
∑N
k=0 V
T ξk = V
TX0 = X˜0 where X˜0 represents the virtual inventory of player X. We
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observe that the i-th component of X˜0 characterizes the solution of the i-th virtual assets. So,
for each virtual asset the instability is lead by the correspondent virtual kernel, i.e., the kernel
relative to the i-th virtual asset is given by G ·λi, where λi is the related i-th eigenvalues. Then,
for the Schied and Zhang instability result we know that if we want non oscillatory solutions, θ
has to be greater than G(0) · λi/4 for all i. In other words the critical value is given by:
θ∗ = max
i=1,2,...,M
G(0) · λi
4
.
Let us denote with λ∗ the eigenvalue of Q which diverges when M → ∞. WLOG we may
assume that λ1 = λ
∗, the first eigenvalue of Q and we denote with v1 the associated eigenvector.
Then, there exists an inventory X0 s.t. vT1X
0 6= 0, since v1 6= 0, so that the solution of the first
virtual asset is not trivial. Therefore, when M →∞ this solution exhibits spurious oscillations
∀ θ ∈ R and we may conclude.
Proof of Corollary 4.3. The eigenvalues of Q are λ1 = 1 − q + qM and λ2:M = 1 − q, where
v1 = e, the vector with all 1, is the virtual asset associated with λ1. Then, when M →∞ the
first eigenvalue diverges so for Theorem 4.2 we conclude.
Proof of Corollary 4.4. We first note that by Theorem 4.2 it is sufficient to prove that there
exists a cluster which is unbounded. Indeed, we observe that
Q = Q̂+ q

e1
e2
...
eK

[
e1 e2 · · · eK
]
where
Q̂ =

Q1 − qe1e
T
1 0 · · · 0
0 Q2 − qe2e
T
2 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 QK − qeKe
T
K
 .
Then by Theorem 8.1.8 pag.443 of Golub and Van Loan (2013) λ1(Q) ≥ λ1(Q̂) where λi(Q)
denotes the i-th largest eigenvalue of Q and respectively of Q̂. However, the eigenvalues of Q̂
are given by the eigenvalues of Qi − qeie
T
i for i = 1, 2, . . . ,K. For each i, λ1(Qi − qeie
T
i ) =
1 − qi +Mi(qi − q) and the rests Mi − 1 eigenvalues are equal to 1 − qi. So, if there exists a
cluster such that Mi is unbounded for any value of θ, then λ1(Qi − qeie
T
i ) is unbounded and
also the respective eigenvalue of Q, so by Theorem 4.2 we conclude that there is no a finite
value for θ such that the market is weakly stable.
So, let us first start by fixing the number of cluster to K < ∞. Then, when M tends
to infinity at least one of the cluster will increase to infinity, which means that there exists a
cluster such that λ1(Qi − qeie
T
i )→∞ and also the respective eigenvalue of Q goes to infinity.
Therefore, we conclude for Theorem 4.2.
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For the general case we conclude by contradiction. If K(M) is the number of cluster for a
fixed M , and K(M) → ∞ when M → ∞ then the set {Mi : i ∈ N} is unbounded. Indeed, if
supi∈NMi = S < ∞, then the average number of stocks in a cluster is
∑K(M)
i=1 Mi
K(M) ≤ S for all
M and this is in contradiction with the assumptions that limM→+∞
M
K(M) → +∞. So since
{Mi : i ∈ N} is unbounded we conclude that there is no finite value of θ such that it is greater
than all the eigenvalues of Q when M →∞.
Note that the bound is not strict since the largest eigenvalue of a block diagonal matrix with
identical blocks is also 1 + 2h
M
. Indeed, Let consider the block diagonal matrix with K identical
clusters
Q :=

Q(ρ) 0 · · · 0
0 Q(ρ) · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 Q(ρ)
 ∈ RM×M ,
where Q(ρ) ∈ RMc is a one-factor matrix and Mc ·K = M . We observe that Q ∈ A
M
h if and
only if ρ = 2h(Mc−1)M , therefore
λ1(Q) = 1 + (Mc − 1)ρ = 1 +
2h
M
.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. WLOG G(0) = 1. We observe that E[1{σk(l)<i, σk(j)=i} ·ξ
i
kξ
j
k] = P(A∩B) ·
E[ξikξ
j
k] where for all l 6= j, A = {σk(l) < i} and B = {σk(j) = i} ∀k. However,
P(A ∩B) =
i−1∑
h=1
P({σk(l) = h, σk(j) = i}),
and
P({σk(l) = h, σk(j) = i}) =
(J − 2)!
J !
=
1
J · (J − 1)
∀ fixed h < i.
Therefore
P(A ∩B) =
i−1∑
h=1
P({σk(l) = h, σk(j) = i}) =
(i− 1)
J · (J − 1)
.
The expect cost for the j-th player is given by:
E[CT (ξ
j |ξ−j)]−Xj0S0 = E
[ N∑
k=0
(
1
2
(ξjk)
2 + θ(ξjk)
2 +
J∑
i=2
J∑
l=1,l 6=j
1{σk(l)<i, σk(j)=i}ξ
l
kξ
j
k
− Sξtkξ
j
k
)]
= E
[
N∑
k=0
(
1
2
(ξjk)
2 + θ(ξjk)
2 +
J∑
i=2
J∑
l=1,l 6=j
1{σk(l)<i, σk(j)=i}ξ
l
kξ
j
k
− (S0tk −
k−1∑
m=0
G(tm − tk)
M∑
l=1
ξlm)ξ
j
k
)]
.
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However:
E[
N∑
k=0
ξjkS
0
tk
] = Xj0S
0
0 ,
N∑
k=0
(ξjk)
2(1/2 + θ) +
N∑
k=0
ξjk
k−1∑
m=0
G(tm − tk)ξ
j
m =
1
2
(ξj)TΓθξ
j ,
E[
N∑
k=0
ξjk
( J∑
i=2
∑
l 6=j
1{σk(l)<i, σk(j)=i}ξ
l
k +
k−1∑
m=0
G(tm − tk)
∑
l 6=j
ξlm
)
] =
=
N∑
k=0
ξjk
 J∑
i=2
∑
l 6=j
(i− 1)
J · (J − 1)
ξlk +
k−1∑
m=0
G(tm − tk)
∑
l 6=j
ξlm
 ,
so that
E[CT (ξ
j|ξ−j)] = E
[
1
2
(ξj)TΓθξ
j
]
+
N∑
k=0
ξjk
( J∑
i=2
∑
l 6=j
(i− 1)
J · (J − 1)
ξlk
+
k−1∑
m=0
G(tm − tk)
∑
l 6=j
ξlm
)
Appendix B. The role of initial inventories in multi-agent mar-
ket impact games
Here we analyse how the equilibrium solution is affected by the inventories of the agents. We
consider J = 4 Fundamentalist sellers having different initial inventory. In all cases we fix
the total initial inventory to X10 +X
2
0 +X
3
0 +X
4
0 = 4. As a benchmark case we consider the
case of equal inventories Xi0 = 1 (see top left panel of Figure 15). When the inventory of one
seller is 1/2 and equal to 7/6 for the three remaining ones, we observe that the solution of the
small seller tends to concentrate more orders at the beginning of the session (top right panel of
Fig. 15). By reducing the inventory of the small seller, setting her inventory equal to 1/10 in
competition with other three sellers with inventory equal to 13/10, the behavior of the former
becomes more similar to that of an Arbitrageur (see bottom left panel of Fig. 15). In fact, the
optimal solution is to place all positive orders at the beginning and wait the end of the trading
session to liquidate the excess volume, exploiting the position of the big Fundamentalists. Also
we observe that in contrast to the J = 2 case the shape of the solution for big sellers is not
affected by the presence of the small one.
To get some intuition on this result, we remind that in the two agents case Schied and Zhang
(2018) showed that the solution is characterized by the sum and difference of the inventories,
see Equation (1) and (2). Thus, if the two traders have the same inventory the solution is
fully characterized by the vector v, which is scaled by the sum of the inventories. Figure 2 of
Schied and Zhang (2018) shows the shapes of v and w, and we note that the former is a vector
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Figure 15: Nash equilibrium for J = 4 Fundamentalist sellers for four different sets of initial
inventory such that the total volume traded is 4. The time grid has 16 points, G(t) = exp(−t),
and θ = 10.
which assigns more trades at the beginning, while w tends to concentrate orders at the end
of trading session. Let us suppose that X10 < X
2
0 , then the solution for trader 1 is a linear
combination of v and w with opposite signs (thus positive at the beginning and negative at
the end), while for the second trader the solution is approximately given by a positive linear
combination of v and w (an asymmetric U-shape), so that its equilibrium’s shape converges to
a U-shape. In particular, in the case of X10 << X
2
0 , at the equilibrium, the first seller will place
positive orders at the beginning while at the end he/she will place opposite sign orders.
Let us go back to the J = 4 case. We have observed how the presence of a single small seller
does not affect the shapes of the big ones. However, this may be related to market dominance
of the big sellers. Indeed, if we analyse the complementary case when there is only one big
seller with inventory equal to 37/10 against three small sellers whose inventories are all equal to
1/10, we observe from the bottom right panel of Figure 15 that the optimal schedule for the big
sellers approaches to a U-shape like in the J = 2 case, while the small agents behaves similarly
to Arbitrageurs.
Therefore, in a multi-agent market along with the increasing in competition we have also to
take into account another effect which is the market dominance in terms of inventory. Obviously
this effect is masked in the J = 2 case. We conclude by conjecturing that when the market is
dominated by small agents the optimal schedule for the big sellers approach to a U-shape form,
like in the J = 2 case, while its shape is invariant when market is dominated by sellers with the
same inventory volume size.
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